A Continuous Dilemma
A Continuous Dilemma
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.102.1.337
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发表时间：
2012-02-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Oprea, Ryan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Friedman, Daniel;Oprea, Ryan
我们研究了连续时间内的囚徒困境，其流动收益累积超过60秒。在大多数情况下，相互合作的平均比率约为90%。控制会话与重复匹配超过八个子周期实现不到一半的合作，和合作率接近零，在一个镜头会话。在后续会议与一个可变数量的子周期，合作率几乎线性增加的网格大小的减少，并与一秒钟的子周期，他们接近连续的水平。我们的数据支持了一系列理论，解释了在囚徒困境中，快速反应的能力如何稳定合作，并使背叛不稳定。
We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent. Control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases, and, with one-second subperiods, they approach continuous levels. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma.