Blurring the moral limits of data markets: biometrics, emotion and data dividends

Blurring the moral limits of data markets: biometrics, emotion and data dividends
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DOI:
10.1007/s00146-023-01739-5
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发表时间:
2023-08
期刊:
影响因子:
3
通讯作者:
V. Bakir;Alexander Laffer;Andrew McStay
V. Bakir;Alexander Laffer;Andrew McStay
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
V. Bakir;Alexander Laffer;Andrew McStay

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本文探讨了自由主义哲学家迈克尔·桑德尔(Michael Sandel)提出的“市场的道德极限”,即向人们支付有关其生物识别和情感数据的想法。桑德尔认为,人类生活的某些方面(如我们的身体和身体部位)应该超越货币化和交换,其他人则认为,个人信息管理系统等新兴技术可以实现个人和组织之间更公平,付费的数据交换,即使是关于我们身体和情感的高度个人数据。由于数据伦理领域很少涉及支付问题,本文探讨了有关数据红利的规范性问题。它通过在英国范围内进行具有人口统计学代表性的在线调查来量化评估成年人对通过个人信息管理系统获得有关其生物特征和情绪的个人数据的付费的看法,从而产生数据红利,这是通过市场和财产的棱镜来看待个人数据的前提。该文件发现不同的态度基于社会人口特征,出售的个人数据的类型,以及出售给组织的类型。它认为,(a)桑德尔关于市场道德界限的论点在保护社会中那些可以说是最没有能力的人(如穷人)的基本自由方面具有价值;但(B)特别是使用的背景模糊了关于基本自由和市场的道德界限。
This paper considers what liberal philosopher Michael Sandel coins the ‘moral limits of markets’ in relation to the idea of paying people for data about their biometrics and emotions. With Sandel arguing that certain aspects of human life (such as our bodies and body parts) should be beyond monetisation and exchange, others argue that emerging technologies such as Personal Information Management Systems can enable a fairer, paid, data exchange between the individual and the organisation, even regarding highly personal data about our bodies and emotions. With the field of data ethics rarely addressing questions of payment, this paper explores normative questions about data dividends. It does so by conducting a UK-wide, demographically representative online survey to quantitatively assess adults’ views on being paid for personal data about their biometrics and emotions via a Personal Information Management System, producing a data dividend, a premise which sees personal data through the prism of markets and property. The paper finds diverse attitudes based on socio-demographic characteristics, the type of personal data sold, and the type of organisation sold to. It argues that (a) Sandel’s argument regarding the moral limits of markets has value in protecting fundamental freedoms of those in society who are arguably least able to (such as the poor); but (b) that contexts of use, in particular, blur moral limits regarding fundamental freedoms and markets.