Are Founding Families Special Blockholders? - An Investigation of Controlling Shareholder Influence on Firm Performance
Are Founding Families Special Blockholders? - An Investigation of Controlling Shareholder Influence on Firm Performance
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创始家族是特殊股东吗？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2134805
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jean‐Philippe Weisskopf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dušan Isakov;Jean‐Philippe Weisskopf
本文考察了2003 - 2010年瑞士上市公司的家族和非家族所有权对公司业绩的影响。我们区分这两种类型的控股股东，因为他们有不同的目标。我们假设，只有家族股东有一个真实的动机，以减少代理成本，而非家族大股东是类似于广泛持有的公司。我们的研究结果表明，家族企业比广泛持有或拥有非家族大股东的公司更有利可图。对于市场估值，我们发现家族股权起着至关重要的作用，并证明了家族所有权和托宾Q之间的凹关系。我们还研究了家族企业的不同特征对绩效的影响，并证明了家族的产生和家族的积极参与对市场估值起着重要作用。
This paper examines how family and non-family ownership affects the performance of Swiss listed firms from 2003 to 2010. We distinguish between these two types of controlling shareholders since they have different objectives. We hypothesise that only family shareholders have a real incentive to reduce agency costs whereas non-family blockholders are similar to widely held companies. Our results show that family firms are more profitable than companies that are widely held or have a non-family blockholder. For market valuations we find that the family stake plays a critical role and document a concave relationship between family ownership and Tobin’s Q. We also investigate the impact of different features of family firms on performance, and document that the generation of the family and the active involvement of the family play an important role for market valuation.