The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation
The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation
复制标题
在职对政府组建的条件影响
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Randolph Stevenson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lanny W. Martin;Randolph Stevenson
先前关于联合政治的研究发现了政府组建中的“在职优势”，但没有明确解释为什么存在这种优势。我们将现有的理论分类为基于偏好或基于制度的解释，为什么现任联盟可能会再次形成，我们将这些解释整合成一个连贯的理论论证。我们还主张，在某种程度上，通过考虑联盟谈判的“历史背景”，可以从经验上区分这些解释。使用一个全面的新的数据集在欧洲联盟谈判，我们表明，联盟，一般来说，更有可能形成，如果组成他们的政党在最近的过去一起工作，现任联盟更有可能重新形成，如果合作伙伴没有经历过严重的公共冲突，而在办公室一起或遭受最近的挫折在民意调查。如果合作伙伴陷入冲突或失去立法席位（即使考虑到席位份额对联盟规模的影响），在职优势也完全消失。此外，在某些情况下，赋予现任者在联合谈判中优势的制度规则大大提高了他们继续执政的能力。
Previous research on coalition politics has found an “incumbency advantage” in government formation, but it has provided no clear explanation as to why this advantage exists. We classify existing theories as either preference-based or institutions-based explanations for why incumbent coalitions might be likely to form again, and we integrate these explanations into a coherent theoretical argument. We also claim that it is possible, to some extent, to distinguish these explanations empirically by taking into account the “historical context” of coalition bargaining. Using a comprehensive new data set on coalition bargaining in Europe, we show that coalitions, in general, are more likely to form if the parties comprising them have worked together in the recent past, and that incumbent coalitions are more likely to re-form if partners have not experienced a severe public conflict while in office together or suffered a recent setback at the polls. The incumbency advantage disappears completely if partners have become mired in conflict or have lost legislative seats (even after accounting for the impact of seat share on coalition size). Moreover, in certain circumstances, institutional rules that grant incumbents an advantage in coalition bargaining greatly enhance their ability to remain in office.