Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks
Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks
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DOI：
10.1007/s11098-014-0326-8
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发表时间：
2015-04-01
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Franklin-Hall, L. R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Franklin-Hall, L. R.
实在论和反实在论对自然类的解释都具有明显的优点：实在论者可以直接理解自然类的明显客观性，而反实在论者可以直接理解自然类的可知性。本文阐述了一个适当的反现实主义的帐户，旨在捕捉这两个优点。特别是，它建议将自然种类理解为“分类瓶颈”，这些类别不仅最好地为我们服务，我们的特殊目标和认知能力，而且还有广泛的替代代理人。通过认可一个最终主观的分类原则，这种观点回避了现实主义观点所面临的认识论困难。然而，尽管如此，它还是识别出了相当（尽管不是完全）独立于立场或客观的自然种类。
Both realist and anti-realist accounts of natural kinds possess prima facie virtues: realists can straightforwardly make sense of the apparent objectivity of the natural kinds, and anti-realists, their knowability. This paper formulates a properly anti-realist account designed to capture both merits. In particular, it recommends understanding natural kinds as 'categorical bottlenecks,' those categories that not only best serve us, with our idiosyncratic aims and cognitive capacities, but also those of a wide range of alternative agents. By endorsing an ultimately subjective categorical principle, this view sidesteps epistemological difficulties facing realist views. Yet, it nevertheless identifies natural kinds that are fairly, though not completely, stance-independent or objective.