The impact of investors’ risk aversion on the performances of capacity remuneration mechanisms
The impact of investors’ risk aversion on the performances of capacity remuneration mechanisms
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DOI：
10.1016/j.enpol.2017.10.008
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
9
通讯作者：
A. Abani;Nicolas Hary;V. Rious;M. Saguan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Abani;Nicolas Hary;V. Rious;M. Saguan
本文分析了风险规避对容量报酬机制绩效的影响，投资者面临着一个不确定的高峰负荷。为此，研究了三种市场设计：竞争性的纯能量市场、容量市场和战略储备机制。基于系统动力学的仿真模型的开发，以代表投资决策和分析每个市场设计的行为。风险厌恶是通过计算条件风险值来模拟的。结果进行了讨论的可靠性（限制短缺的能力）和成本（总发电成本）的研究市场设计的影响。当比较这三种市场设计时，无论是在成本还是可靠性方面，容量市场似乎受风险规避的影响最小。这一结果表明，实施容量市场是可取的，以应对风险规避的不利影响，给定的模拟和参数，使用。
This paper analyses the impact of risk aversion on the performances of capacity remuneration mechanisms, with investors facing an uncertain peak load. Three market designs are studied for this purpose: a competitive energy-only market, a capacity market and a strategic reserve mechanism. A simulation model based on system dynamics is developed in order to represent investment decisions and analyse the behaviour of each market design. Risk aversion is modelled through the computation of Conditional Value at Risk. The results are discussed in terms of impact on the reliability (ability to limit shortages) and cost (total generation costs) of the studied market designs. When comparing the three market designs, the capacity market seems to be the least affected by the introduction of risk aversion, both in terms of cost and reliability. This result suggests that implementing a capacity market is preferable in order to deal with the adverse effects of risk aversion, given the simulations and parameters that were used.