THE JOINT-DECISION TRAP - LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN-INTEGRATION
THE JOINT-DECISION TRAP - LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN-INTEGRATION
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9299.1988.tb00694.x
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发表时间：
1988-09-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
SCHARPF, FW
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
SCHARPF, FW
与早期的预期相比，欧洲一体化进程产生了一个悖论：没有解体的挫折和没有进步的韧性。本文试图通过探索德国联邦制的联合决策（“politikverfleechtung”）与欧共体决策之间的相似性，对这一悖论进行制度解释。本文认为，在这两种情况下，成员国政府直接参与中央决策的事实，以及一致决策的事实要求，将系统性地产生次优政策结果，除非能够维持“解决问题”（而不是“讨价还价”）的决策风格。事实上，“讨价还价”的风格在这两种情况下都占了上风。然而，由此产生的公共政策的病态既没有导致政策责任进一步欧洲化的成功战略，也没有导致令人不满意的联合决策系统的解体。这种“联合决策陷阱”可以通过参考成员国政府的效用函数来解释，对这些成员国来说，尽管目前的制度安排的政策产出不是最优的，但与更大的集中化或解体相比，它们似乎代表了“局部最优”。
Compared to early expectations, the process of European integration has resulted in a paradox: frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress. The article attempts to develop an institutional explanation for this paradox by exploring the similarities between joint decision making (‘Politikverflechtung’) in German federalism and decision making in the European Community. In both cases, it is argued, the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is ade factorequirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub‐optimal policy outcomes unless a ‘problem‐solving’ (as opposed to a ‘bargaining’) style of decision making can be maintained. In fact, the ‘bargaining’ style has prevailed in both cases. The resulting pathologies of public policy have, however, not resulted either in successful strategies for the further Europeanization of policy responsibilities or in the disintegration of unsatisfactory joint‐decision systems. This ‘joint‐decision trap’ is explained by reference to the utility functions of member governments for whom present institutional arrangements, in spite of their sub‐optimal policy output, seem to represent ‘local optima’ when compared to either greater centralization or disintegration.