Are Investors the Bad Guys? Tenure and Neighborhood Stability in Chelsea, Massachusetts
Are Investors the Bad Guys? Tenure and Neighborhood Stability in Chelsea, Massachusetts
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6229.2011.00317.x
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发表时间：
2011-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
L. Fisher;Lauren Lambie‐Hanson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Fisher;Lauren Lambie‐Hanson
在这篇文章中，我们研究了在最近的住房危机中，投资者和居住者在城市环境中的作用。我们把重点放在马萨诸塞州的切尔西，因为这是一个人口密集的城市，主要是多户住宅结构，丧失抵押品赎回权的比例很高，我们有特别好的数据。我们使用本地数据区分了居住者-业主和投资者，我们发现许多投资者在住房抵押贷款披露法案数据中被错误地归类为居住者-业主。然后，采用竞争风险框架来研究1998年至2010年中期期间的所有权，我们发现，当地投资者倾向于在购买价格方面投资更多，并更快地出售，在融资条件下，他们经历的抵押贷款止赎风险约为居住者-业主的1.8倍。非本地投资者与居住者-业主在止赎风险方面没有统计学显著差异。尽管如此，当房价下跌时，那些拥有次级购买抵押贷款的业主（其中大多数是自住业主）面临着最高的止赎风险。
In this article, we examine the role of investors and occupant‐owners in an urban context during the recent housing crisis. We focus on Chelsea, Massachusetts, because it is a dense city, dominated by multifamily housing structures with high rates of foreclosure for which we have particularly good data. We distinguish between occupant‐owners and investors using local data, and we find that many investors are misclassified as occupant‐owners in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data. Then, employing a competing risks framework to study ownerships during the period 1998 through mid‐2010, we find that local investors, who tend to invest more in relation to purchase prices and sell more quickly, experienced approximately 1.8 times the mortgage foreclosure risk of occupant‐owners, conditional on financing. Nonlocal investors have no statistically significant difference in foreclosure risk from occupant‐owners. Nonetheless, those owners with subprime purchase mortgages (most of whom are occupant‐owners) faced the highest foreclosure risk when house prices fell.