Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy
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把关人：第三方执行策略剖析
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036906
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发表时间：
1986
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Reinier H. Kraakman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Reinier H. Kraakman
我们应该在什么时候向那些尽管不是不当行为的主要作者或受益者，但可能仍然能够防止这种行为的当事人施加责任？这个问题--有不同的标签--“抵押品”、“第三方”或“次级”责任--出现在许多法律背景中，从会计师和律师对其客户的欺诈行为的责任(Jennings and Marsh：1162-66,1209-12)，到制裁雇用非法外国人的雇主的立法建议(C.Schwartz)。在大多数这样的环境中，附带责任通过招募他们的同伙和市场联系人作为事实上的“巡逻警察”来补充直接威慑主要违法者的努力。因此，它引发了与任何执法设备相同的实用性和成本问题。2在本文中，我将针对一种重要的附带责任类型来研究这些问题，我将其称为“看门人责任”：对能够通过拒绝与违法者合作来扰乱不当行为的私人当事人施加的责任。
When should we impose liability on parties who, although not the primary authors or beneficiaries of misconduct, might nonetheless be able to prevent it? This question—variously labeled as the problem of" collateral,"" thirdparty," or" secondary" liability—arises in numerous legal contexts, ranging from the responsibility of accountants and lawyers for the frauds of their clients (Jennings and Marsh: 1162-66, 1209-12) to legislative proposals for sanctioning employers who hire illegal aliens (C. Schwartz). In most of these settings, collateral liability supplements efforts to deter primary wrongdoers directly by enlisting their associates and market contacts as de facto" cops on the beat."'As such, it raises the same issues of practicality and cost that attend any enforcement device. 2 In this article, I examine these issues for one important genre of collateral liability that I term" gatekeeper liability": liability imposed on private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.