Is False Belief Understanding Continuous from Infancy to Preschool Age
Is False Belief Understanding Continuous from Infancy to Preschool Age
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错误信念理解从婴儿期到学龄前持续吗
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467630.003.0017
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
B. Sodian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Sodian
直到最近，对能动性的理解的发展一直被认为涉及概念的变化（参见 Carey，2009，第 203 页）。虽然婴儿和幼儿被认为对目标导向的行动有基本的理解，但这被认为不涉及命题态度，即主体对世界状态的表征。基于对幼儿对错误信念的理解的大量研究（参见 Wellman，2011，2014，评论），心理表征理论被认为在 4 岁左右发展，此时儿童掌握了口头错误信念任务。早期和后来对心理状态的理解之间的概念重组被描述为从欲望到信念/欲望心理学的转变（Bartsch＆Wellman，1995）或从无差别的假装和信念（“prelief”）概念到信念、假装和现实之间的区分的概念分化（Perner，Baker，＆Hutton，1994）。这种标准的、概念改变的心理理论发展观受到了关于婴儿期错误信念理解的新发现的挑战（Baillargeon、Scott 和 He，2010）。Carey（2009）回顾了关于婴儿期错误信念理解的第一个研究（Onishi 和 Baillargeon，2005），并初步得出结论，语言前的婴儿有能力代表主体的认知心理状态（第 17 页）。 211），表明在心理发展过程中发生的是概念连续性而不是概念变化。
Until recently, development of an understanding of agency has been characterized as involving conceptual change (see Carey, 2009, p. 203ff.). While infants and toddlers were assumed to possess a basic understanding of goal-directed action, this was thought not to involve propositional attitudes, that is, representations of agents’ representations of states of the world. On the basis of a large body of research on young children’s developing understanding of false belief (see Wellman, 2011, 2014, for reviews), a representational theory of mind was thought to develop around the age of 4 years, when children master verbal false belief tasks. The conceptual restructuring between an earlier and a later understanding of mental states was characterized as the transition from a desire to a belief/desire psychology (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995) or as a conceptual differentiation from an undifferentiated concept of pretense and belief (“prelief”) to a differentiation between belief, pretense, and reality (Perner, Baker, & Hutton, 1994). This standard, conceptual-change view of theory of mind development has been challenged by new findings on false belief understanding in infancy (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010).Carey (2009) reviewed the first studies on false belief understanding in infancy (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) and concluded, tentatively, that prelinguistic infants have the capacity to represent an agent’s epistemic mental states (p. 211), suggesting conceptual continuity rather than conceptual change as taking place in the development of mental