E ¢ cient Design with Interdependent Valuations
E ¢ cient Design with Interdependent Valuations
复制标题
具有相互依赖的评估的高效设计
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Moldovanu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Jehiel;B. Moldovanu
我们研究有效的，贝叶斯-纳什激励兼容机制的社会选择设置，允许信息和分配的外部性。我们表明，这种机制存在，只有当一个一致的条件有关的私人和社会的信息替代率是萨蒂斯的…如果信号是多维的，则全等条件由可积性约束确定，并且它仅在值是私有的或某个对称性假设成立的非一般情况下成立。如果信号是一维的，同余条件降低到一个单调性约束，它可以是一般萨蒂斯的。我们将结果应用到多物品拍卖的研究中，并讨论了为什么这种拍卖不能被简化为一维模型而不失一般性。
We study e¢cient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satis...ed. If signals are multi-dimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, and it can hold only in non-generic cases where values are private or a certain symmetry assumption holds. If signals are one-dimensional, the congruence condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint and it can be generically satis...ed. We apply the results to the study of multi-object auctions, and we discuss why such auctions cannot be reduced to one-dimensional models without loss of generality.