Imperfect Competition in the Recycling Industry
Imperfect Competition in the Recycling Industry
复制标题
回收行业的不完全竞争
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-999x.2005.00204.x
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Eichner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Eichner
我们研究的是这样一个经济体中的市场配置：在这个经济体中，材料被用于生产消费品，然后被回收，最后被填埋，而且回收企业拥有市场支配力。材料含量构成了绿色产品设计的一个方面，影响着回收成本。虽然回收企业提供的回收服务是低效率的，但它并没有滥用其市场力量来扭曲产品设计配置。提出了不同的政策方案来纠正市场失灵。一个很有希望的方案是制定一个相对的回收标准，并结合消费税、材料补贴和回收服务补贴。
We study the market allocation in an economy where material is used for producing a consumption good, then recycled and finally landfilled, and where a recycling firm has market power. The material content constitutes an aspect of green product design and affects the recycling costs. Although the recycling firm's supply of recycling services is inefficiently low, it does not abuse its market power to distort the product design allocation. Different policy schemes are proposed which correct for market failures. One promising candidate is a relative recycling standard combined with a consumption good's tax, a material subsidy and a subsidy on recycling services.