Regional Variation in Strategic Positional Rivalries
Regional Variation in Strategic Positional Rivalries
复制标题
战略地位竞争的地区差异
DOI:
10.1007/978-981-99-0557-7_4
复制
发表时间:
2023
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Sakuwa Kentaro
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Lee Chia-yi;Tominaga Yasutaka;Sakuwa Kentaro
This chapter explores how regions differ in conflict and peace with a special focus on the role of positional rivalries—strategic rivalries over positions in the international system. Compared to spatial/territorial rivalries, however, the dynamics of positional rivalries have been less systematically examined. More importantly, the relationship between the presence of positional rivalry and regional variation in conflict and peace has not been fully analyzed in the empirical international relations literature. Why do some regions have positional rivalries while others have few? Also, what makes existing positional rivalries more prone to wars and conflicts? This chapter begins by exploring the distribution of positional rivalries across time and space. States in some regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia, North America, and South Asia, are especially active in developing rivalry relationships over positions. The chapter then empirically evaluates two major hypotheses. First, positional rivalries are likely to develop in regions with great powers. Unlike spatial/territorial issues, positional ones are closely related to extraterritorial ambitions to be influential beyond the state’s immediate neighborhood. The propensity for positional rivalry development is likely when states are powerful enough in a geographic area. Second, positional rivalries tend to generate overt conflicts when a clear hierarchical structure does not exist in the region. When the region lacks an undisputed hegemonic order—especially when the regional influence is contested among multiple powers—competition over the influential position is likely to escalate into clashes both because states are more willing to challenge the status quo by force and because uncertainties create a greater opportunity for conflict. A set of empirical analyses drawing on strategic rivalries data and the Correlates of War conflict data from 1816 to 2010 are conducted to test these propositions. The chapter concludes with implications for the causes of regional variation in war and peace.