Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments
Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments
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作为迷信状态的妄想：背景、划分和承诺
DOI：
10.1353/ppp.2010.0030
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Bayne
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Bayne
尽管妄想通常被视为某种信念，但至少从布洛伊勒时代起，人们就一直对妄想的信念概念感到担忧。我们可以称他们为“反信仰主义者”，他们不仅担心妄想是信仰的说法，而且还拒绝这一说法。赖默的论文深入探讨了“信念论者”和“反信念论者”之间的争论，指出反对信念妄想概念的主要论点之一——我们可以称之为功能角色反对——是基于一个谬误。她还提请人们注意妄想与她所说的“虚无主义哲学教义”之间的某些相似之处，例如我们没有知识的怀疑立场。我认为雷默给反信仰主义者提出了一个两难的困境：他们要么必须对哲学虚无主义采取反信仰的处理，要么必须找出虚无主义状态与妄想状态不同的一个关键方面。正如她所说，“如果我们要从精神错觉中剔除‘信仰’这个标签，……理性的平等要求我们从对[标准]哲学教义看似真诚的认可中剔除它”(2010, 317)。尽管雷默本人并不赞同妄想的信念，但她显然对此非常同情。雷默的讨论对当代妄想讨论做出了非常受欢迎的贡献，我从中学到了很多东西。不过，我确实有疑问。在这篇评论的第一部分中，我重点讨论雷默的立场到底是什么的问题。她的观点有多种观点，我不清楚它的多种观点是否可以相互调和。在第二部分和第三部分中，我从雷默的论文中退一步，询问关于妄想的迷信地位的争论中究竟可能存在哪些利害关系。
Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘antidoxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a fallacy. She also draws attention to certain parallels between delusions and what she calls “nihilistic philosophical doctrines,” such as the skeptical position that we have no knowledge. I read Reimer as presenting the anti-doxasticist with a dilemma: they must either adopt an anti-doxastic treatment of philosophical nihilism or they must identify a crucial respect in which nihilistic states differ from delusional states. As she puts it, “If we are to withhold the label ‘belief’ from psychiatric delusions, . . . parity of reason requires that we withhold it from seemingly sincere endorsements of [standard] philosophical doctrines” (2010, 317). Although Reimer herself stops short of endorsing the doxastic conception of delusions, she is clearly very sympathetic to it. Reimer’s discussion is a very welcome contribution to the contemporary discussion of delusions, and I have learnt much from it. I do, however, have questions. In the first part of this commentary I focus on the question of what exactly Reimer’s position is. Her view has multiple strands, and it is not clear to me that its various strands can be reconciled with each other. In the second and third sections, I take a step back from Reimer’s paper and ask what exactly might be at stake in the debate about the doxastic status of delusions.
妄想和其他非理性信念
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Bortolotti
通讯作者：
Bortolotti