Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy
Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy
复制标题
掠夺性定价：战略理论与法律政策
作者：
P. Bolton;Joseph F. Brodley;M. Riordan
本文提出了一种新的基于战略分析的掠夺性定价法律的规则。最高法院在布鲁克一案中的判决强调对掠夺和补偿计划进行仔细分析，要求进行这种分析。同时对过去20年经济发展中掠夺性定价的严格分析为实现更有效的法律的政策提供了必要的工具。经济学现在可以解释什么时候掠夺是理性的，或者用布鲁克的话来说，什么时候它可以实现有利可图的补偿，从而为早期的掠夺性定价提供了新的视角。法律的分析的进一步挑战是制定可行的法律的规则，以指导执法机构的政策和司法决定。为了实现这一点，我们提出了一个结构化的规则的原因，包括一个完全指定的效率辩护。根据这种办法，执法工作将侧重于市场结构和行为使掠夺行为看似合理以及反竞争影响已经发生或极有可能发生的案件。同样重要的是，如果低于成本的定价是实现显著效率（包括动态效率）所必需的，则掠夺的发现将受到效率合理性的制约。
This paper proposes a new legal rule on predatory pricing based on strategic analysis. The Supreme Court's decision in Brooke with its emphasis on closely analyzing the scheme of predation and recoupment calls for such an analysis. At the same time economic development over the last 20 years of a rigorous analysis of predatory pricing provides the tools required to achieve a more effective legal policy. Economics can now explain when predation can be rational, or in Brooke's terms when it can enable profitable recoupment, casting new light on earlier examples of predatory pricing. The further challenge for legal analysis is to develop workable legal rules to guide enforcement agency policy and judicial decisions. To accomplish this we propose a structured rule of reason, including a fully specified efficiencies defense. Under such an approach enforcement would focus on cases where market structure and conduct makes predation plausible and where anticompetitive effects have occurred, or are dangerously probable. Equally important, the finding of predation would be subject to an efficiencies justification where below-cost pricing is necessary to achieve significant efficiencies, including dynamic efficiencies.