Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey
Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey
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不完全竞争下的环境政策：调查
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Requate
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Requate
在这篇文章中，我调查的理论文献在不完全竞争的存在下，从20世纪60年代到现在的早期贡献的环境政策。我涵盖了以下的市场结构时，污染企业在输出市场上的市场势力：垄断，古诺寡头垄断，Bertrand双寡头垄断同质产品，定价双寡头与差异化的商品，和垄断竞争的模型。在后者中，我认为古诺寡头垄断与自由进入，迪克西特-斯蒂格利茨模型，和Salop？这是一个有污染企业的循环城市模式。我所关注的监管工具是排放税、可交易的许可证以及绝对和相对标准。我还讨论了税收时，企业在投入市场的市场势力，我研究模型，企业行使市场势力在市场上的可交易许可证。在后一种情况下，我也调查了一些最近的结果，从文献的实验经济学。最后，我简要地讨论了在开放经济中，当企业在国际市场上拥有市场支配力时的环境政策。在这里，我建议不同的分解的单边第二最优税率，从而试图统一这些分解在文献中的替代解释。
In this article I survey the theoretical literature on environmental policy in the presence of imperfect competition, ranging from early contributions in the 1960s to the present. I cover the following market structures when polluting firms have market power in the output market: monopoly, Cournot oligopoly, Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous products, pricesetting duopoly with differentiating commodities, and models of monopolistic competition. Among the latter I consider Cournot oligopoly with free entry, the Dixit-Stiglitz model, and Salop?s model of the circular city with polluting firms. The regulation instruments I concentrate on are emission taxes, tradable permits, and both absolute and relative standards. I also discuss taxation when firms have market power in the input market, and I study models where firms exercise market power in the market of tradable permits. In the latter case I also survey some recent results from the literature on experimental economics. Finally, I briefly discuss environmental policy in open economies when firms have market power in international markets. Here I suggest different decompositions of the unilateral second-best optimal tax rate, thus attempting to unify alternative interpretations of these decompositions in the literature.