Incentives for Transshipment in a Supply Chain with Decentralized Retailers
Incentives for Transshipment in a Supply Chain with Decentralized Retailers
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.1110.0326
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发表时间：
2011-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jing Shao;H. Krishnan;S. McCormick
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文献类型：
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作者：
Jing Shao;H. Krishnan;S. McCormick
我们研究了分散化供应链中的转运激励，其中垄断者通过独立的零售商分销产品。一个关键的见解是，转运价格决定了企业是从转运中受益，还是受到转运的损害。特别是，我们发现制造商倾向于设定尽可能高的转运价格，而零售商倾向于较低的转运价格。鉴于转运价格在决定每家公司从转运中获得的利益方面的重要作用，在零售商共同所有(“连锁店”)而转运价格不起作用的情况下，考虑转运是有用的。这种比较产生了两个令人惊讶的结果。首先，如果分散的零售商控制转运价格，他们会选择相对较低的转运价格，以减轻制造商通过提高批发价格获取利润的能力；因此，制造商可能更愿意与没有转运价格的连锁店打交道，而不是与分散的零售商打交道。同样，分散的零售商可以使用较低的转运价格来实现比连锁店更高的总利润。
We examine transshipment incentives in a decentralized supply chain where a monopolist distributes a product through independent retailers. A key insight is that the transshipment price determines whether the firms benefit from, or are hurt by, transshipment. In particular, we show that the manufacturer prefers to set the transshipment price as high as possible, whereas retailers prefer a lower transshipment price. Given the important role of the transshipment price in determining the benefits that each firm gets from transshipment, it is useful to consider transshipment in the case where retailers are under joint ownership (a “chain store”) and the transshipment price does not play a role. This comparison yields two surprising results. First, if decentralized retailers control the transshipment price, they will choose a relatively low transshipment price as a way to mitigate the manufacturer's ability to extract profits by increasing wholesale prices; therefore, the manufacturer may prefer dealing with the chain store, which does not have a transshipment price, rather than with decentralized retailers. Similarly, the decentralized retailers can use a low transshipment price to achieve higher total profits than a chain store.