The Political Economy of Blockchain Governance
The Political Economy of Blockchain Governance
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区块链治理的政治经济学
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3537314
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Parkes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barton E. Lee;Daniel J. Moroz;D. Parkes
我们使用正式政治理论中的工具开发了区块链治理理论。区块链项目背后的软件经常更新(分叉)以实施新政策，而这些分叉是我们调查的主题。考虑到网络效应和用户对不同策略的偏好，我们研究了分散的治理结构和用户偏好如何影响策略的实施。我们描述了几种类型的叉子，并确定了每种叉子所必需的战略条件。我们表明，网络效应可以激励不那么温和的政策建议，并强调加密货币交易所创造的市场摩擦在促进所有用户采用的非争议性分叉方面的作用。该模型解释了在区块链系统治理中观察到的违反直觉的现象。
We develop a theory of blockchain governance using tools from formal political theory. The software underlying blockchain projects is frequently updated (forked) to implement new policies, and these forks are the subject of our inquiry. We investigate the ways in which the decentralized governance structure and preferences of users influence which policies are implemented, considering network effects as well as user preferences for different policies. We describe several types of forks and identify the strategic conditions necessary for each. We show that network-effects can motivate less moderate policy proposals, and highlight the role of market frictions created by cryptocurrency exchanges in promoting non-contentious forks that are adopted by all users. The model explains counter-intuitive phenomena that have been observed in the governance of blockchain systems.