International Tax Competition: There is No Need for Cooperation in Information Sharing
International Tax Competition: There is No Need for Cooperation in Information Sharing
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国际税务竞争：信息共享无需合作
DOI：
10.1111/1467-9396.00402
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Makris
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Makris
本文研究了一个模型，在这个模型中，小型开放经济体选择税务机关之间的信息交换程度和一套不受限制的资本所得税。作者表明，在信息共享的合作并不重要的均衡结果。这与现有的结果和政策执行者的共同信念形成鲜明对比。这一结果的原因是，如果扭曲性税收的集合是不受限制的，那么，根据经济的特点，要么信息共享变得多余，要么非合作均衡的特点是零信息交换和过度提供信息。
A model is investigated in which small open economies choose the degree of information exchange among tax authorities and an unrestricted set of capital income taxes. The author shows that cooperation in information sharing does not matter in equilibrium outcomes. This comes in striking contrast to existing results and the common belief among policy practitioners. The reason for this result is that if the set of distortionary taxes is unrestricted then, depending on the characteristics of the economy, either information sharing becomes redundant or the non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by zero information exchange and overprovision of information.