Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying
Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.333323
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发表时间：
2002-09
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Paul Belleflamme
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Paul Belleflamme
穆萨-罗森（Mussa-Rosen，1978）在一个统一的模型中研究了（私人的、小规模的）复制对信息产品生产者定价行为的影响。当复制技术涉及边际成本而没有固定成本时，生产者独立行动。在这个简单的框架中，我们强调事前和事后效率考虑之间的权衡（如何提供正确的激励措施，同时限制垄断扭曲？）。当复制技术涉及固定成本而没有边际成本时，定价决策是相互依赖的。我们研究的战略定价博弈，重点放在一些重要的对称纳什均衡。
The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria.