Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives
Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives
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私有化中性定理：当一家上市公司追求总体目标时
DOI：
10.1111/jere.12143
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Kojun Hamada
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
浅見泰司;中川雅之編著（沓澤隆司分担執筆）;Rasmus Fatum and Yohei Yamamoto;Kojun Hamada
本文考察了当上市公司追求福利最大化以外的一般目标时的私有化中立定理。这一定理表明，当政府给予企业最优补贴时，私有化前后的福利是完全相同的。然而，我们提出了一个看似自相矛盾的结果。当上市公司错误地假设补贴改变福利规模时，私有化必然是福利中性的，而当上市公司正确地认识到补贴只带来收入再分配而不影响福利时，中立的情况是有限的。
This paper examines the privatization neutrality theorem when a public firm pursues general objectives other than welfare maximization. This theorem states that when the government gives firms optimal subsidies, welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization. However, we present a seemingly paradoxical result. When a public firm incorrectly assumes that subsidies change the welfare size, privatization is necessarily welfare neutral, whereas when the public firm correctly recognizes that subsidies only bring about income redistribution, without affecting welfare, the situations in which neutrality holds are limited.