Self-selection and the redistributive impact of in-kind transfers - An econometric analysis
Self-selection and the redistributive impact of in-kind transfers - An econometric analysis
复制标题
DOI：
10.2307/146214
复制
发表时间：
1997-03-01
影响因子：
5.2
通讯作者：
Jacoby, HG
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jacoby, HG
自我瞄准的福利计划越来越受到经济学家和政策制定者的关注。本文为实物转让劣质商品的再分配影响提供了证据。我研究了牙买加的一个学校供餐计划，向所有学生分发一种清淡的零食。贫困家庭和有更多符合条件的孩子的家庭被发现更有可能自我选择参加该计划。但是，与这些目标收益相比，估计会有很大的无谓损失。
Self-targeting welfare programs have received increasing attention from economists and policymakers alike. This paper provides evidence on the redistributive impact of transferring low-quality goods in-kind. I study a school feeding program in Jamaica, which distributes a bland snack to all students. Poorer households and those with a greater number of eligible children are found significantly more likely to self-select into the program. But, against these targeting benefits is a large estimated dead-weight loss.