Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?
Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1100.1204
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发表时间：
2010-09-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Xiao, Wenqiang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Taylor, Terry A.;Xiao, Wenqiang
本文考虑了一家制造商向一家拥有卓越需求预测信息的报刊零售商进行销售的情况。我们表明，制造商的预期利润在零售商的预测准确性方面是凸的：当且仅当零售商已经是良好的预测者时，制造商才能从向预测更好的零售商销售产品中受益。如果零售商的预测能力较差，那么随着零售商预测能力的提高，制造商也会受到损害。更一般地说，如果产品经济效益有利（差），制造商往往会因零售商预测能力的提高而受到伤害（受益）。最终，最优采购合同是数量折扣合同。
This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract.