Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
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候选人稳定性和非二元社会选择
DOI：
10.1007/s00199-002-0279-6
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
J. Weymark
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lars Ehlers;J. Weymark
可以通过不同方式正式规定投票程序不受候选人战略性退出的影响。Dutta、杰克逊和Le布雷东（Econometrica，2001）最近证明了这一候选稳定性性质的两种形式化与投票程序的其他一些理想性质不相容。本文证明了Grether和Plott对阿罗定理的非二元推广可以用来提供他们的两个不可能定理的简单证明。
The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems.