WORKING PAPER SERIES
WORKING PAPER SERIES
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_13
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发表时间：
2005
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ulrike Muehlberger
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文献类型：
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作者：
Ulrike Muehlberger
我们注意到，经济结构调整正在显著改变组织治理。一方面，我们看到兼并和收购的增加，这取代了等级制度，另一方面，我们看到外包和分包活动的增加，似乎用市场取代了等级制度。然而，有证据表明，越来越多的外包活动将等级制度与市场治理形式相结合。本文的主要论点是，企业已经建立了基于市场，等级制度和自我约束的关系契约的治理结构，使他们能够保持大量的控制，尽管外包劳动力。此外，我们认为，这种层次形式的外包产生依赖。使用奥地利保险业的经验证据，它表明，依赖性的创建，首先，由合同限制的替代用途的资源，第二，支持措施，约束上游方密切下游方，第三，由上游方所作的relationshipspecific投资，和第四，由权威元素。1我要感谢科林·克劳奇、杰奎琳·奥莱利、西尔维娅·夏拉和马丁·扎格勒提出的有益的意见和建议。
We observe that economic restructuring is significantly changing organizational governance. On the one hand, we witness an increase in mergers & acquisitions, which substitutes markets for hierarchies and, on the other hand, we see an increase in outsourcing and subcontracting activities, appearing to replace hierarchies by markets. However, there is evidence that an increasing part of outsourcing activities mix hierarchies with market forms of governance. The key argument of this paper is that firms have established governance structures based on markets, hierarchies and selfenforcing relational contracts so that they are able to keep a substantial amount of control despite of sourcing out labour. Furthermore, we argue that such hierarchical forms of outsourcing produce dependency. Using empirical evidence of the Austrian insurance industry, it is demonstrated that dependency is created, firstly, by the contractual restriction of alternative uses of resources, secondly, by support measures that bind the upstream party closely to the downstream party, thirdly, by relationshipspecific investments made by the upstream party, and fourthly, by authority elements. 1 I would like to thank Colin Crouch, Jacqueline O’Reilly, Silvana Sciarra, Martin Zagler for helpful comments and suggestions.