Clash of civilizations, or realism and liberalism deja vu? Some evidence

Clash of civilizations, or realism and liberalism deja vu? Some evidence
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DOI:
10.1177/0022343300037005003
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发表时间:
2000-09-01
影响因子:
3.6
通讯作者:
Cox, M
Cox, M
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Russett, BM;Oneal, JR;Cox, M

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我们评估塞缪尔亨廷顿的《文明的冲突和世界秩序的重建》中的命题在多大程度上可以解释1950- 1992年间国家间军事化争端的发生。我们发现,这种传统的现实主义的影响,如邻近,联盟,和相对权力,和自由的影响,联合民主和相互依存,提供了一个更好的说明国家间的冲突。在其他条件不变的情况下,跨越文明边界的凝视并不比其他国家更容易陷入争端。甚至西方与世界其他地区或与伊斯兰教之间的争端也不比大多数其他群体之间或内部的争端更常见。在亨廷顿的八种文明中,只有在西方国家内部,国家间冲突的可能性要小得多;在现实主义和自由主义的影响保持不变的情况下,其他文明中的二元对立国家与不同文明之间分裂的国家一样,都有可能发生冲突。一个核心国家对文明的统治,无论是民主的还是非民主的,都无助于抑制文明内部的暴力。与文明冲突将取代冷战对抗成为冲突最大根源的论点相反,随着冷战的减弱,跨越文明边界的军事化国家间争端变得不那么常见,而不是更常见。文明似乎也没有通过现实主义或自由主义变量对国家间冲突产生重要的间接影响。它们有助于预测联盟模式,但对解释政治制度或商业互动几乎没有贡献。我们可以感谢亨廷顿挑战我们考虑文明在国际关系中可能发挥的作用,但几乎没有证据表明他们定义了国际冲突可能发生的断层线沿着。
We assess the degree to which propositions from Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of world Order can account for the incidence of militarized interstate disputes between countries during the period 1950-92. We find that such traditional realist influences as contiguity, alliances, and relative power, and liberal influences of joint democracy and interdependence, provide a much better account of interstate conflict. Pairs of stares split across civilizational boundaries are no more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states ceteris paribus. Even disputes between the West and the rest of the world, or with Islam, were no more common than those between or within most other groups. Among Huntington's eight civilizations, interstate conflict was significantly less likely only within the West; dyads in other civilizations were as likely to fight as were states split across civilizations, when realist and liberal influences are held constant. The dominance of a civilization by a core state, democratic or nor, does little to inhibit violence within the civilization. Contrary to the thesis that the clash of civilizations will replace Cold War rivalries as the greatest source of conflict, militarized interstate disputes across civilizational boundaries became less common, not more so, as the Cold War waned. Nor do civilizations appear to have an important indirect influence on interstate conflict through the realist or liberal variables. They help to predict alliance patterns but make little contribution to explaining political institutions or commercial interactions. We can be grateful that Huntington challenged us co consider the role that civilizations might play in international relations, but there is little evidence char they define the fault lines along which international conflict is apr to occur.