Legislative Committees as Uncertainty Reduction Devices in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies
Legislative Committees as Uncertainty Reduction Devices in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies
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立法委员会作为多党议会民主国家减少不确定性的手段
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Zucchini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Curini;F. Zucchini
大多数关于议会民主国家多党立法机构中的委员会的研究都集中在它们在解决内阁内部授权问题方面的作用。使用一个简单的空间模型，本文讨论了委员会如何也可以解决在联盟不稳定、政府议程控制薄弱和缺乏政府变革的环境中出现的不确定性问题。为了经验性地探讨委员会如何解决这些问题，本文关注的是过去30年来sede Legativa的成功(后来又衰落)，这是一种立法程序，在意大利立法委员会中正式确立了“普遍性”。统计结果在很大程度上证实了理论预期。
Most research on committees in multiparty legislatures in parliamentary democracies focuses on their role in solving intra-cabinet delegation problems. Using a straightforward spatial model, this article discusses how committees can also solve uncertainty problems that arise in settings characterised by unstable coalitions, weak governmental agenda control and a lack of government change. In order to explore empirically how committees solve these problems, the article focuses on the success (and later decline) over the last 30 years of the sede legislativa, a law-making procedure that formalises ‘universalism’ in Italian legislative committees. The statistical results largely confirm the theoretical expectations.