Does Religion Promote Trust? The Role of Signaling, Reputation, and Punishment
Does Religion Promote Trust? The Role of Signaling, Reputation, and Punishment
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宗教能促进信任吗？
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发表时间：
2005
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通讯作者：
R. Sosis
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作者：
R. Sosis
包括迪尔凯姆、拉帕波特、特纳和韦伯等著名学者在内的宗教学者普遍认为，宗教促进了信徒之间的团体内部信任。最近经济学家、认知科学家和进化人类学家将信号理论应用于宗教行为，进一步支持了这一假设。然而，信任并没有在作者之间得到严格或一致的定义，这使得概括很难评估。在这里，我遵循Bacharach和Gambetta（2001）对信任的行为定义，并表明在宗教社区中，群体内信任的条件往往不满足，特别是孤立主义和封闭的社区，这些社区通常被认为是高水平信任的原因。相反，在这样的社区中，合作是通过有效地惩罚骗子和提高诚实声誉的价值的制度结构来维持的。这些团体提供了一个有限的社会舞台，在这个舞台上，人们可以建立、评估、奖励和有效地惩罚声誉，从而有利于集体行动。虽然面对面的互惠关系消除了封闭宗教社区内信任行为的需要，但当社会群体是流动的时，宗教习俗和象征性标志成功地促进了群体内成员和居住在不同社区的匿名同教者之间的信任。此外，这些宗教身份标志可能被非团体成员用作可信赖的信号。*我感谢Candace Alcorta， Joseph Bulbulia, Sharon Feldstein， Bradley Ruffle和两位匿名审稿人对本文早期草稿的非常有帮助的评论。我还要感谢罗素·塞奇基金会（信托倡议）和康涅狄格大学对这个项目的慷慨资助。宗教促进信任吗？3不要轻信任何人；因为誓言是稻草，人的信仰是薄饼……威廉·莎士比亚《亨利五世的一生》（第二章，第三章）[A]具有广泛信任和广泛信任的群体比没有这种信任和信任的同类群体能取得更多的成就。虽然人们普遍认为宗教和信任都与当前的世界事务直接相关，但令人惊讶的是，很少有人关注它们是如何相互关联的。这一点尤其值得注意，因为最近宗教研究的理论发展认为，信任在产生宗教团体被假定提供的合作衍生利益方面起着重要作用（见Sosis和Alcorta 2003）。经济学家（Berman 2000; Carr and Landa 1983; Iannaccone 1992, 1994），认知科学家（Atran 2002; bulbullia 2004a, 2004b），以及进化人类学家(Cronk 1994; Irons 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; 2001, 2004; Sosis 2003,2004；Sosis和Alcorta（2003）在应用信号理论来建模和解释宗教行为方面取得了一致，这些行为从作为这些学科基础的以自我为基础的模型（例如，理性选择，进化博弈论）的角度来看是令人困惑的。这些研究人员认为，宗教行为表明了群体承诺，从而增强了群体内部的信任，促进了集体行动。在信号框架之外工作的许多作者也断言宗教可以增强社区成员之间的信任（例如，Boudon 1987; Collins 2004; Shield 2002； Steadman和Palmer 1995； Weber 1958: 302-322）。然而，信任定义的不一致限制了对这种关系进行概括的能力。即使在我们日常使用的术语中，也存在歧义。通俗地说，我们可以用信任这个词来描述代理人对其他代理人的态度。因此，信任有时表示对另一个代理的可靠性有信心的态度。然而，我们也用信任来描述行为。因此，信任就是对另一个代理的可靠性抱有信心的态度。“理查德信任约瑟夫”这句话可能指的是理查德对约瑟夫持有的一种特定态度，也可能指的是由于这种态度而表现出来的一种实际行为——例如，理查德信任约瑟夫保管他的钱包。在接下来的讨论中，所有提到信任的都是指它的行为用法，而不是它的态度用法。我之所以关注信任的行为方面，是因为宗教观察家们普遍对信任行为的显著程度发表了评论。在我的《可信的美国大学词典》中，信任被定义为名词、动词和形容词，共有23种定义。难怪这个词会引起这么多的困惑！《跨学科宗教研究杂志》第1卷（2005），第7条由某些宗教团体的成员展示，较少强调更难观察和衡量鼓励这些行为模式的态度和价值观。为了解决本文标题中提出的问题，我首先提供了一个信任的定义，这个定义可以很容易地纳入宗教行为的信号模型，并在各种类型的信任之间进行描述。我澄清了增强信任对个人和团体的好处，以及我们期望宗教团体表现出高水平的团体内部信任的条件。然后，我考察了几个研究得很好的宗教团体中信任的普遍程度。总结一下主要论点，虽然许多研究人员坚持认为宗教增加了信任，但我认为这实际上可能是虚幻的。大多数观察家所声称的是对宗教团体的信任，特别是那些要求其成员做出排他承诺的团体，实际上是制度框架的结果，这种框架有效地惩罚了骗子，并支持那些保持诚实声誉的人获得收益。这些社区，我称之为“封闭的”（见下文），可以有效地惩罚不诚信，并提供声誉历史，因为社会关系是有限的。这种受限制的社会舞台是由宗教仪式和象征性标志（如服装、发型）创造的，这些标志清楚地表明和区分了群体内外的成员。然而，当群体成员是流动的，个人保持多个群体身份时，惩罚和声誉机制的影响较小。因此，这些“开放”的宗教团体往往依靠宗教认可的做法和象征性的标志来培养信任。宗教行为和徽章也促进了居住在不同社区的匿名群体成员之间的信任，并从增加非群体成员的信任感中产生了显着的利益。
Scholars of religion, including such luminaries as Durkheim, Rappaport, Turner, and Weber, have widely assumed that religion promotes intragroup trust among adherents. Recent applications of signaling theory to religious behavior among economists, cognitive scientists, and evolutionary anthropologists further endorse this assumption. However, trust has not been rigorously or consistently defined across authors, making generalizations difficult to evaluate. Here I follow Bacharach and Gambetta’s (2001) behavioral definition of trust and show that the conditions for intragroup trust are often not met in religious communities, especially isolationist and closed communities to which high levels of trust are typically ascribed. Rather, in such communities, cooperation is maintained through institutional structures that effectively punish cheaters and enhance the value of an honest reputation. These groups gainfully facilitate collective action by offering a circumscribed social arena in which reputations can be built, evaluated, rewarded, and efficiently punished. While face-to-face reciprocal relations obviate the need for trusting behavior within closed religious communities, when social groups are fluid, religious practices and symbolic markers are successful in promoting trust among in-group members and anonymous coreligionists who reside in different communities. In addition, these religious badges of identity may be used by non-group members as signals of trustworthiness. *I thank Candace Alcorta, Joseph Bulbulia, Sharon Feldstein, Bradley Ruffle, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. I additionally thank the Russell Sage Foundation (Initiative on Trust) and the University of Connecticut for generous funding of this project. Sosis: Does Religion Promote Trust? 3 Trust none; for oaths are straws, men’s faiths are wafer-cakes ... William Shakespeare The Life of King Henry the Fifth (Pistol at II, iii) [A] group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness and trust. Coleman (1988: S101) While it is broadly recognized that both religion and trust are directly relevant to current world affairs, surprisingly little attention has been given to how they are related to each other. This is particularly notable because recent theoretical developments in the study of religion posit that trust plays an important role in generating the cooperatively derived benefits that religious groups are presumed to offer (see Sosis and Alcorta 2003). Economists (Berman 2000; Carr and Landa 1983; Iannaccone 1992, 1994), cognitive scientists (Atran 2002; Bulbulia 2004a, 2004b), and evolutionary anthropologists (Cronk 1994; Irons 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; 2001, 2004; Sosis 2003, 2004; Sosis and Alcorta 2003) have converged in applying signaling theory to model and explain religious behaviors that are puzzling from the perspectives of the egoistic-based models that serve as these disciplines’ foundations (e.g., rational choice, evolutionary game theory). These researchers have argued that religious behaviors signal group commitments, thus enhancing intragroup trust and facilitating collective action. Various authors working outside the signaling framework have also asserted that religion enhances trust among community members (e.g., Boudon 1987; Collins 2004; Shield 2002; Steadman and Palmer 1995; Weber 1958: 302–322). However, inconsistency in definitions of trust have limited the ability to make generalizations about this relationship. Even in our everyday use of the term, there is ambiguity. 1 Colloquially, we may employ the word trust to characterize the attitude of agents toward other agents. Thus trust sometimes denotes an attitude of confidence about another agent’s reliability. However, we also use trust to describe behavior. Accordingly, to trust is to act on this attitude of confidence about another agent’s reliability. The statement “Richard trusts Joseph” may refer to a specific attitude that Richard maintains about Joseph, or it may refer to an actual behavior that manifests itself as a consequence of the attitude—for instance, that Richard trusts Joseph with his wallet. In the discussion that follows, all references to trust refer to its behavioral usage, not its attitudinal one. This focus on the behavioral aspects of trust is motivated by the fact that observers of religion have generally commented on the remarkable levels of trusting behavior 1 In my trusty American College Dictionary, trust is defined as a noun, a verb, and an adjective, and 23 definitions are offered. No wonder this term has caused so much confusion! 4 Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion Vol. 1 (2005), Article 7 exhibited by members of certain religious communities, with less emphasis on the more difficult to observe and measure attitudes and values that encourage these behavioral patterns. To address the question posed in the title of this article, I first offer a definition of trust that can be easily incorporated into signaling models of religious behavior and delineates between various types of trust. I clarify the benefits that enhanced trust has for individuals and groups and the conditions under which we would expect religious communities to exhibit high levels of intragroup trust. I then examine the prevalence of trust within several well-studied religious communities. To summarize the main argument, while many researchers have maintained that religion increases trust, I argue that this may in fact be illusory. Most of what observers claim is trust in religious communities, especially those communities that demand exclusive commitment from their members, is actually a consequence of institutional frameworks that effectively punish cheaters and support gains for those who maintain an honest reputation. These communities, which I refer to as “closed” (see below), can efficiently punish untrustworthiness and offer reputational histories because social relations are bounded. This circumscribed social arena is created by religious rituals and symbolic markers (e.g., clothing, hairstyles) that clearly signal and demarcate inand out-group membership. However, when group memberships are fluid and individuals maintain multiple group identities, punishment and reputational mechanisms are less influential. Consequently, these “open” religious communities often rely on religiously endorsed practices and symbolic markers to foster trust. Religious behaviors and badges also promote trust between anonymous in-group members residing in different communities and generate epiphenomenal benefits from increased perceived trustworthiness by nongroup members.