Evolutionary Competition Between Adjustment Processes in Cournot Oligopoly: Instability and Complex Dynamics
Evolutionary Competition Between Adjustment Processes in Cournot Oligopoly: Instability and Complex Dynamics
复制标题
古诺寡头垄断调整过程之间的演化竞争：不稳定与复杂动态
DOI：
10.1007/s13235-018-0238-x
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
J. Tuinstra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Hommes;M. Ochea;J. Tuinstra
我们考虑古诺寡头垄断模型中调整过程之间的演化竞争模型，并研究增加企业数量的影响。我们的重点是纳什游戏与一般的短记忆自适应调整过程。我们发现，尽管纳什博弈具有稳定影响，但市场上企业数量的充分增加往往会使古诺-纳什均衡变得不稳定。这表明 Theocharis（Rev Econ Stud 1960）的著名结果，即古诺寡头垄断市场对于三个以上的企业来说是不稳定的，是稳健的，尽管纳什企业的存在导致不稳定阈值增加。我们确定该阈值的存在和水平都取决于与纳什游戏相关的信息成本。此外，即使需求和成本是线性的，随着企业数量的增加，调整过程之间的相互作用自然会导致复杂的内生波动的出现。
We consider a model of evolutionary competition between adjustment processes in the Cournot oligopoly model and investigate the effect of increasing the number of firms. Our focus is on Nash play versus a general short-memory adaptive adjustment process. We find that, although Nash play has a stabilizing influence, a sufficient increase in the number of firms in the market tends to make the Cournot-Nash equilibrium unstable. This shows that the famous result by Theocharis (Rev Econ Stud 1960), that Cournot oligopoly markets are unstable for more than three firms, is robust, although the instability threshold increases in the presence of Nash firms. We establish that both theexistenceand thelevelof this threshold depend on the information costs associated with Nash play. Moreover, the interaction between adjustment processes naturally leads to the emergence of complicated endogenous fluctuations as the number of firms increases, even when demand and costs are linear.