The Westminster Model and the "Indivisibility of the Political and Administrative Elite": A Convenient Myth Whose Time Is Up?
The Westminster Model and the "Indivisibility of the Political and Administrative Elite": A Convenient Myth Whose Time Is Up?
复制标题
威斯敏斯特模式和“政治和行政精英的不可分割性”：一个方便的神话，谁的时代到了？
DOI：
10.1111/gove.12225
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Richards D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richards D
本文认为，在政治和行政精英之间的关系的不可分割性原则作为一个中心公约的威斯敏斯特系统的大部分时间的20世纪。它探讨了近几十年来，这一原则如何受到向委托代理方法转变的挑战。它认为，这种转变在多大程度上削弱了传统的威斯敏斯特模式的部长公务员关系的理解，作为一个共生的相互依存的伙伴关系的基础上。取而代之的是一种更为普遍的指挥和控制关系，这种关系被认为是满足现代问责制和透明度要求所必需的。这种变化从根本上改变了部长和公务员之间长期存在的权力交易，破坏了威斯敏斯特模式的核心原则。
This article argues that the principle of indivisibility in the relationship between political and administrative elites acted as a central convention of the Westminster system for much of the twentieth century. It explores how in more recent decades this principle has been challenged by the shift to a principal–agent approach. It considers the extent to which this shift diminishes the traditional Westminster model's understanding of the minister–civil servant relationship as one based on a symbiotic interdependent partnership. In its place has emerged a more universal command and control relationship that is seen as necessary to meet the demands of modern accountability and transparency. Such a change has fundamentally altered a long‐established power‐bargain between ministers and civil servants and undermined a core tenet of the Westminster model.