Understanding the Multinational Game: Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism
Understanding the Multinational Game: Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism
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理解跨国博弈：走向不对称联邦制理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. I. Zuber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. I. Zuber
本文提出了一个多民族国家不对称联邦制的基本理论。建立在博弈论基础上的两个论点将中央和地区精英的战略选择与联邦稳定问题联系起来。第一个论点涉及不对称制度的建立。在中央政府和威胁退出框架的少数民族之间的对抗游戏中，中央政府决定给予不对称自治权，以确保相互合作。然而，通过扩大少数民族地区的自治程度，联邦的不对称性创造了第三个参与者，即非自治地区。因此，第二个论点模型不对称的联邦制作为一个“嵌套的游戏”，在民族竞技场的事件决定在联邦竞技场的回报。从考虑所有领域的所有参与者的角度来看，不对称的联邦规则本身就不稳定。对俄罗斯联邦制发展的叙述证实了这一理论。
This article presents a baseline theory of asymmetrical federalism in multinational states. Two arguments building on a game-theoretic foundation link central and regional elites’ strategic choices to questions of federal stability. The first argument concerns the creation of asymmetrical institutions. In a confrontation game between the center and national minorities credibly threatening to exit the framework, the center’s decision to grant asymmetrical autonomy ensures mutual cooperation. Yet by extending the level of autonomy for minority regions, federal asymmetry creates a third player, the nonadvantaged regions. Consequently, the second argument models asymmetrical federalism as a “nested game” where events in the ethnonational arena determine the payoffs in the federal arena. Asymmetrical federal rules turn out to be inherently unstable from a perspective that takes all actors in all arenas into account. A narrative of the development of Russian federalism exemplifies the theory.