Inequality and Democratization
Inequality and Democratization
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不平等与民主化
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1144087
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David J. Samuels
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ben W. Ansell;David J. Samuels
经济发展对民主化的影响长期以来一直是社会科学家关注的问题，最近的主要研究集中在经济不平等和因素专用性的影响上。Boix(2003)提出，当经济平等程度较高、要素专用性较低时，民主化更有可能。Acemoglu和Robinson(2006)认为，当不平等处于中等水平时，民主化更有可能发生。这两种观点都假定，民主化是专制精英对不同程度不平等的再分配成本的相对恐惧的结果。借鉴契约主义的政治理论，我们认为，民主化不是要求精英阶层进行再分配，而是要求国家保护。这种不同的理论方法对不平等和民主化之间的关系产生了不同的预测，并表明土地和收入不平等对民主化的影响是不同的。土地分配不均的独裁政体不太可能民主化，而收入严重不平等的独裁政体更有可能民主化。
The impact of economic development on democratization has long concerned social scientists, with prominent recent research focusing on the effects of economic inequality and factor specificity. Boix (2003) suggests that democratization is likelier when economic equality is high and factor-specificity is low. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that democratization is more likely when inequality is at middling levels. Both arguments assume that democratization is a function of autocratic elites' relative fear of the costs of redistribution at different levels of inequality. Drawing on contractarian political theory, we suggest that democratization is not about demands for redistribution from the elite; it is about demands for protection from the state. This alternative theoretical approach generates different predictions about the relationship between inequality and democratization, and suggests that land and income inequality impact democratization differently. Autocracies with unequal land distribution are less likely to democratize, while autocracies with substantial income inequality are more likely to democratize.