Edinburgh Research Explorer Bidding for talent in sport
Edinburgh Research Explorer Bidding for talent in sport
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爱丁堡研究探索者竞标体育人才
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Barcelona Gse
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Roberto Burguet;Jzsef SÆkovics;Barcelona Gse
我们为运动员市场提供了一种新的微结构。俱乐部同时瞄准球员出价，在（纳什）均衡中，取决于其他俱乐部（cid：146）出价（cid：150），未被雇用的球员是否会参加比赛。当人才稀缺或外部选择较少时，我们支持（cid：150）并将Rottenberg（1956）和Fort and Quirk（1995）的Coasian结果推广到异质参与者：人才分配是有效的，并且独立于初始所有权（cid：148）和收入分享安排。我们还描述了人才充足（或具有高外部选择）时的均衡。该分析使用了一个非特定的俱乐部目标，并在金钱和非金钱贝内之间进行了内源性交易。
We present a novel micro-structure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether (cid:150)depending on the other clubs(cid:146)bids (cid:150)a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options, we support (cid:150) and generalize to heterogeneous players (cid:150) the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is e¢ cient and independent of initial (cid:147)ownership(cid:148) and revenue sharing arrangements. We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a non-speci(cid:133)c club objective with an endogenously derived trade-o⁄ between pecuniary and non-pecuniary bene(cid:133)ts.