Philosophical perspectives on constructivist views of learning
Philosophical perspectives on constructivist views of learning
复制标题
建构主义学习观的哲学视角
DOI：
10.1207/s15326985ep2901_4
复制
发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
8.8
通讯作者：
Robert E. Floden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Prawat;Robert E. Floden
目前，SODA1建构主义者除了认同知识是一种社会产品这一重要假设外，几乎没有达成什么共识。除此之外，对于问题几乎没有达成一致意见。关于谈判的意义意味着什么以及谈判的目标应该是什么(即，战略/技能与大想法)的不同观点反映了对学习和真理本质的不同假设。我们通过对比三种基本的世界观来检验这些假设：机械-信息处理、组织-激进建构主义和杜威的语境主义或交易现实主义。我们认为，这种第三世界的观点与以观念为基础的社会建构主义最为一致。
At present, soda1 constructivists agree on little more than the important assumption that knowledge is a social product. Beyond this, there is little agreement about proems. Different viewpoints about what it means to negotiate meaning and what the object of that negotiation ought to be (i.e., strategies/skills versus big ideas) reflect different assumptions about learning and the nature of truth. We examine these assumptions by contrasting three underlying world views: mechanistic-information processing, organismic-radical constructivism, and Deweyan contextualism or transactional realism. This third world view, we argue, is most consistent with idea-based social constructivism.