Theory and Evidence
Theory and Evidence
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0149.1982.tb01895.x
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通讯作者：
Leora F. Klapper;Allen Berger;Zsuzsanna Fluck;William Greene;J. Kallberg;Richard Rosen;Anthony Saunders;Greg Udell;Larry
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作者：
Leora F. Klapper;Allen Berger;Zsuzsanna Fluck;William Greene;J. Kallberg;Richard Rosen;Anthony Saunders;Greg Udell;Larry
本文发现理论和实证证据表明，有担保信贷额度（L/Cs）与表现出高违约风险的商业借款人有关。我们的程式化理论模型讨论了当企业家有能力无成本地将现金流转移给自己，而第三方（如法院）证明转移的成本过高时，信用证的最佳使用。然而，我们的模型与以前的工作不同，它特别将道德风险与短期资产（如应收账款）的清算联系起来。具体来说，该模型表明担保信用证在最小化承包成本方面的价值与借款人的商业风险和借款人的客户质量有关。对上市制造企业样本的实证检验为该模型的预测提供了支持。我们发现，有担保信用证的公司风险明显更高，预期增长机会也更少。
This paper finds theoretical and empirical evidence that secured lines of credit (L/Cs) are associated with business borrowers who exhibit a high risk of default. Our stylized theoretical model discusses an optimal use of L/Cs when an entrepreneur has the ability costlessly to divert cash flow to himself and when it is prohibitively costly for a third party (such as a court) to prove diversion. However, our model differs from previous work by specifically linking moral hazard to the liquidation of short-term assets, such as accounts receivable. Specifically, the model demonstrates that the value of a secured L/C in minimizing contracting costs is associated with the business risk of the borrower and the quality of the borrower's customers. Empirical tests on a sample of publicly traded manufacturing firms offer support for the predictions of the model. We find that firms with secured L/Cs are observably riskier and have fewer expected growth opportunities.