Contagion of populist extremism
Contagion of populist extremism
复制标题
民粹主义极端主义蔓延
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104324
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Daiki Kishishita and Atsushi Yamagishi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nakano Satoshi;Washizu Ayu;Daiki Kishishita and Atsushi Yamagishi
为了探索不良政策以民粹主义极端主义的形式传播，我们构建了一个以代理问题为特征的社会学习模型。不同国家的政治家按顺序执行一项政策。选民通过观察外交政策和国内政策来了解现任政治家的类型和可取的政策。我们表明，通过不断变化的舆论和执行的政策之间的动态互动，民粹主义极端主义在各国都会蔓延。这种结构产生了有趣的长期动态。首先，单一的温和政策可能永远足以阻止多米诺骨牌效应。其次，多米诺骨牌效应的持久性取决于各国可取政策的关联性。特别是，尽管极端主义最终会在完美关联下终结，但在不完全关联下，极端主义可能无法逃脱。这些结果说明了分散决策的一个新的负面方面。
To explore the propagation of undesirable policies in a form of populist extremism, we construct a social learning model featuring agency problems. Politicians in different countries sequentially implement a policy. Voters learn the incumbent politician’s type and the desirable policy by observing foreign policies on top of the domestic policy. We show that populist extremism is contagious across countries through the dynamic interaction between the changing public opinion and implemented policies. This structure yields interesting long-run dynamics. First, a single moderate policy could be always enough to stop the domino effect. Second, the persistence of the domino effect depends on the correlation of the desirable policy across countries. In particular, while extremism eventually ends under the perfect correlation, it may become impossible to escape from extremism under the imperfect correlation. These results illuminate a new negative aspect of decentralized policymaking.