Modeling and Analysis of Leaky Deception Using Signaling Games With Evidence
Modeling and Analysis of Leaky Deception Using Signaling Games With Evidence
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DOI：
10.1109/tifs.2018.2886472
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发表时间：
2018-04
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
J. Pawlick;Edward Colbert;Quanyan Zhu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Pawlick;Edward Colbert;Quanyan Zhu
欺骗在经济和技术中起着关键作用，特别是在网络空间的新兴互动中。为了分析相互作用和设计改进相互作用的机制，需要欺骗的整体模型。博弈论提供了这样的模型。特别是，现有的工作模型欺骗使用信号游戏。但信号游戏本质上模拟了无法检测的欺骗行为。在本文中，我们扩展了信号游戏，包括一个检测器，发出概率警告时，发送者的行为欺骗性。然后，我们推导出池和部分分离的博弈均衡。我们发现：1）高质量的检测器消除了一些纯策略均衡; 2）具有高真阳性率的检测器比具有低假阳性率的检测器鼓励更诚实的信号发送; 3）接收器获得等错误率检测器的最佳结果;以及4）令人惊讶的是，欺骗性欺骗有时会受益于高度准确的欺骗检测器。我们说明这些结果与应用程序防御欺骗网络安全。我们的研究结果提供了一个定量和严格的分析的基本方面，可检测的欺骗。
Deception plays critical roles in economics and technology, especially in emerging interactions in cyberspace. Holistic models of deception are needed in order to analyze interactions and to design mechanisms that improve them. Game theory provides such models. In particular, existing work models deception using signaling games. But signaling games inherently model deception that is undetectable. In this paper, we extend signaling games by including a detector that gives off probabilistic warnings when the sender acts deceptively. Then, we derive pooling and partially separating equilibria of the game. We find that: 1) high quality detectors eliminate some pure-strategy equilibria; 2) detectors with high true-positive rates encourage more honest signaling than detectors with low false-positive rates; 3) receivers obtain optimal outcomes for equal-error-rate detectors; and 4) surprisingly, deceptive senders sometimes benefit from highly accurate deception detectors. We illustrate these results with an application to defensive deception for network security. Our results provide a quantitative and rigorous analysis of the fundamental aspects of detectable deception.