Supply chain coordination in the presence of uncertain yield and demand
Supply chain coordination in the presence of uncertain yield and demand
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DOI：
10.1080/00207543.2020.1762942
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发表时间：
2020-05
影响因子：
9.2
通讯作者：
Lei Xie;Junhai Ma;M. Goh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lei Xie;Junhai Ma;M. Goh
本文研究了一个由卖方和买方组成的两级供应链。考虑到买方面临需求和收益率不确定的情况，本文研究了供应链中的回购合约，研究了收益率不确定性和相对议价能力对回购合约绩效的影响。研究结果表明，当卖方议价能力较强且能够控制不确定收益率时，回购合同足以协调供应链。相反，当卖家的议价能力相对较低或不能保证收益率稳定时，回购合同不起作用。为了协调这样的供应链，提出了一种称为回购-回购-收入分享合同的组合合同。此外，本文还给出了使买方和整个供应链的利润最大化的最优订货策略，发现如果卖方不能控制产量，则买方下的订单越少，供应链协调下的双方获得的利润就越低。
This paper focuses on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a seller and a buyer. Considering the case where the buyer faces uncertain demand and yield, the paper investigates the buyback contract for the supply chain and studies how the yield uncertainty and the relative bargaining power affect the performance of buyback contract. The results suggest that when the seller's bargaining power is relatively high and can control the uncertain yield, the buyback contract is sufficient to coordinate the supply chain. Conversely, when the seller's bargaining power is relatively low or cannot guarantee yield stability, the buyback contract does not work. To coordinate such a supply chain, a combined contract named Buy-Back-Revenue-Sharing contract is proposed. Furthermore, this paper presents the optimal orders to maximize the profits of the buyer and the whole supply chain and it finds that if the seller cannot control the yield, the buyer will place fewer orders and both parties will gain lower profit with supply chain coordination.