Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the payoff-driven and conformity-driven update rules
Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the payoff-driven and conformity-driven update rules
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收益驱动和整合驱动更新规则相结合的演化博弈动力学
DOI：
10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110146
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发表时间：
2020-11-01
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Yang, Junzhong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lin, Jingyan;Huang, Changwei;Yang, Junzhong
研究发现，从众在促进合作方面发挥着重要作用。本文结合收益驱动和从众驱动的策略更新规则，提出了一种空间囚徒困境博弈策略更新规则。当噪声强度kappa(1) = kappa(2) = 0.1时，我们的结果表明该模型的动力学总是被吸收到冻结状态。以完全合作、双稳定和完全背叛为序出现三个阶段，且背叛b的诱惑越来越大。在双稳定阶段，动力学可以演化为完全合作状态或完全偏离状态，模型的最终稳定状态主要由沿合作集群平滑边界的同步扩展决定。此外，我们还绘制了kappa - b相图来探讨噪声对合作演化的影响，钟形相图表明合作的产生和维持存在最优不确定性。此外，本文还研究了不同kappa(1)和kappa(2)对合作演化的影响。有趣的是，在适当的参数区域可以发现合作者和叛逃者共存。此外，我们还考虑了另一种整合报酬驱动和从众驱动策略更新规则的方法，结果清楚地表明，在从众强度的最优区域内，合作的进化可以显著增强。当收益驱动和从众驱动的更新规则结合在一起时，这些观察结果丰富了我们对游戏中合作演变的认识。(c) 2020 Elsevier Ltd.版权所有。
Conformity has been found to play a significant role in promoting cooperation. In this paper, we propose a spatial prisoner's dilemma game with a novel strategy updating rule, combining the payoff-driven and conformity-driven update rules. For the noise strengths kappa(1) = kappa(2) = 0.1, our results reveal that the dynamics of this model is always absorbed into the frozen state. Three phases are appeared in the order of full cooperators, bistability and full defectors with increasing temptation to defect b . In the bistability phase, the dynamics can evolve into either a full-cooperator state or full-defector state, and the final steady states of the model are mainly determined by the synchronous expanding along the smooth boundaries of the cooperator clusters. Moreover, the full kappa - b phase diagram is illustrated to explore the effects of noise on the evolution of cooperation in the proposed model, and the bell-shape phase diagrams indicate that there exists an optimal uncertainty for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Furthermore, the effects of distinct kappa(1) and kappa(2) on the evolution of cooperation have also been investigated. Interestingly, the coexistence of cooperators and defectors could be found in appropriate parameter regions. In addition, we also consider another way to integrate the payoff-driven and conformity-driven strategy updating rules, and the outcomes clearly show that the evolution of cooperation can be significantly enhanced within an optimal region of conformity strength. These observations enrich our knowledge of the evolution of cooperation in the games when the payoff-driven and conformity-driven update rules are combined. (c) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.