Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment
Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment
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DOI：
10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00055-3
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发表时间：
1999-01-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Wooton, I
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haufler, A;Wooton, I
我们分析了两个大小不一的国家之间的税收竞争，试图吸引外资垄断者。当国家政府只有一次性的利润税（补贴）可供支配，但面临进口的外生和相同的运输成本时，两国都愿意向公司提供补贴。与此同时，企业更愿意在更大的市场中定位，因为在那里它将能够收取更高的生产者价格。在均衡状态下，如果各国市场的规模差别足够大，大国接受投资，甚至可以征收正税。如果各国被赋予关税或消费税这一额外工具，那么在均衡状态下支付的利润税将进一步增加。(C)1999年由Elsevier Science S.A.出版All rights reserved.
We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When national governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will be willing to offer a subsidy to the firm. At the same time, the firm prefers to locate in the larger market where it will be able to charge a higher producer price. In equilibrium the large country receives the investment and may even be able to charge a positive tax, if the difference in the sizes of the national markets is sufficiently great. The profit tax paid in equilibrium rises further if countries are given an additional instrument of either a tariff or a consumption tax. (C) 1999 Published by Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.