Robust Market Equilibria with Uncertain Preferences
Robust Market Equilibria with Uncertain Preferences
复制标题
具有不确定偏好的稳健市场均衡
DOI：
10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5595
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Shah
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Riley Murray;Christian Kroer;A. Peysakhovich;P. Shah
稀缺物品的分配问题是市场设计中的一个重要的实际问题。一套越来越流行的机制用于这项任务，使用市场均衡的概念：个人报告他们的偏好，有一个真实的或假货币的预算，并计算出一组物品和分配的价格，使需求等于供应。这种机制的一个重要的真实的世界问题是，个人估值往往只是不完全知道。在本文中，我们将展示如何从古典市场均衡的概念可以扩展到反映这种不确定性。我们表明，在线性，可分割的费雪市场的一个强大的市场均衡（RME）总是存在的，这也适用于设置买家可能会保留未花的钱。我们提供了理论分析的RME的配置属性的嫉妒和遗憾。虽然RME是很难计算一般的不确定性集，我们考虑一些自然和易于处理的不确定性集，导致行为良好的配方的问题，可以通过现代凸规划方法来解决。最后，我们表明，非常温和的不确定性估值可能会导致RME分配优于那些估计没有潜在的不确定性。
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences, have a budget of real or fake currency, and a set of prices for items and allocations is computed that sets demand equal to supply. An important real world issue with such mechanisms is that individual valuations are often only imperfectly known. In this paper, we show how concepts from classical market equilibrium can be extended to reflect such uncertainty. We show that in linear, divisible Fisher markets a robust market equilibrium (RME) always exists; this also holds in settings where buyers may retain unspent money. We provide theoretical analysis of the allocative properties of RME in terms of envy and regret. Though RME are hard to compute for general uncertainty sets, we consider some natural and tractable uncertainty sets which lead to well behaved formulations of the problem that can be solved via modern convex programming methods. Finally, we show that very mild uncertainty about valuations can cause RME allocations to outperform those which take estimates as having no underlying uncertainty.