Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads
Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads
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DOI：
10.1145/3038912.3052703
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发表时间：
2017-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Cavallo;Prabhakar Krishnamurthy;M. Sviridenko;Christopher A. Wilkens
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Cavallo;Prabhakar Krishnamurthy;M. Sviridenko;Christopher A. Wilkens
十多年来，广义第二价格(GSP)拍卖一直是赞助搜索广告的核心销售机制。然而，最近的趋势是扩大允许的广告格式集-包括各种大小、装饰和其他显著特征-这给基于GSP的平台带来了严重的问题。Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)拍卖等替代方案带来了不同的复杂情况，因为它们从根本上改变了价格的计算方式。在这篇文章中，我们报告了我们在这种新的背景下从头开始重新设计搜索广告销售系统的努力，提出了一种机制，该机制在全球范围内优化整个广告列表，并计算出实现类似于GSP在原始、更简单的统一广告设置中所拥有的属性的价格。分配-优化和定价-计算的谨慎算法耦合使我们的拍卖能够在实时广告拍卖固有的严格时间限制内运行。我们在雅虎的Gemini搜索平台上报告拍卖的表现结果。
The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends expanding the set of allowed ad formats---to include a variety of sizes, decorations, and other distinguishing features---have raised critical problems for GSP-based platforms. Alternatives such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction raise different complications because they fundamentally change the way prices are computed. In this paper we report on our efforts to redesign a search ad selling system from the ground up in this new context, proposing a mechanism that optimizes an entire slate of ads globally and computes prices that achieve properties analogous to those held by GSP in the original, simpler setting of uniform ads. A careful algorithmic coupling of allocation-optimization and pricing-computation allows our auction to operate within the strict timing constraints inherent in real-time ad auctions. We report performance results of the auction in Yahoo's Gemini Search platform.