Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement and Party-state Fusion in India
Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement and Party-state Fusion in India
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千刀万剐地扼杀宪法：印度的行政强化与党国融合
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3367266
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Tarunabh Khaitan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tarunabh Khaitan
许多关心此事的公民，包括法官、官僚、政治家、活动家、记者和学者，一直声称印度民主在纳伦德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）2014年开始的总理任期内受到威胁。为了检验这一主张，本文建立了一个分析框架，问责机制自由民主宪法到位，以提供对政治执行的检查。我们的假设是，只有以系统的方式拆除这一框架，我们才能声称民主本身处于危险之中。这一框架有助于区分人们可能在意识形态上不同意但仍然被民选政府所允许的行动，以及打击自由民主宪政核心的行动。自由民主宪法通常采用三种方式对政治行政部门提出问责要求：纵向上，要求选举对人民负责;横向上，要求其他国家机构（如司法和第四分支机构）对政治行政部门提出问责要求;横向上，要求媒体、学术界和公民社会对政治行政部门提出话语问责。这一框架保证了长期的民主-即它不仅保证了印度今天的人民，而且保证了印度未来所有人民的民主治理。每一个民选政府都有权在广泛的问题上执行其政策。然而，试图以不利于民主继续运作的方式巩固执政党对权力的控制，不能成为其中之一。文章发现，2014年至2019年执政的第一届莫迪政府确实试图破坏这三种行政问责制。与20世纪70年代印度甘地紧急状态期间对民主规范的攻击不同，几乎没有证据表明这一时期发生了直接或全面的攻击。印度人民党政府的运作模式是微妙的，间接的，渐进的，但也是系统的。因此，文章将这种现象定性为“千刀万剐”。对民主治理的渐进式攻击通常是由效率和善治的管理修辞（由于我们制度不可否认的不完善而变得可信）和极端民族主义的分裂修辞（将党的政治对手称为国家叛徒）的组合来证明的。自2019年大选取得巨大胜利以来，莫迪政府似乎已进入整合模式。早期迹象表明，不再受联盟伙伴要求的约束，它可能会放弃渐进主义方法，对民主宪政进行更直接的攻击。
Abstract Many concerned citizens, including judges, bureaucrats, politicians, activists, journalists, and academics, have been claiming that Indian democracy has been imperilled under the premiership of Narendra Modi, which began in 2014. To examine this claim, the Article sets up an analytic framework for accountability mechanisms liberal democratic constitutions put in place to provide a check on the political executive. The assumption is that only if this framework is dismantled in a systemic manner can we claim that democracy itself is in peril. This framework helps distinguish between actions that one may disagree with ideologically but are nonetheless permitted by an elected government, from actions that strike at the heart of liberal democratic constitutionalism. Liberal democratic constitutions typically adopt three ways of making accountability demands on the political executive: vertically, by demanding electoral accountability to the people; horizontally, by subjecting it to accountability demands of other state institutions like the judiciary and fourth branch institutions; and diagonally, by requiring discursive accountability by the media, the academy, and civil society. This framework assures democracy over time – i.e. it guarantees democratic governance not only to the people today, but to all future peoples of India. Each elected government has the mandate to implement its policies over a wide range of matters. However, seeking to entrench the ruling party’s stranglehold on power in ways that are inimical to the continued operation of democracy cannot be one of them. The Article finds that the first Modi government in power between 2014 and 2019 did indeed seek to undermine each of these three strands of executive accountability. Unlike the assault on democratic norms during India Gandhi’s Emergency in the 1970s, there is little evidence of a direct or full-frontal attack during this period. The Bharatiya Janata Party government’s mode of operation was subtle, indirect, and incremental, but also systemic. Hence, the Article characterizes the phenomenon as “killing a constitution by a thousand cuts.” The incremental assaults on democratic governance were typically justified by a combination of a managerial rhetoric of efficiency and good governance (made plausible by the undeniable imperfection of our institutions) and a divisive rhetoric of hyper-nationalism (which brands political opponents of the party as traitors of the state). Since its resounding victory in the 2019 general elections, the Modi government appears to have moved into consolidation mode. No longer constrained by the demands of coalition partners, early signs suggest that it may abandon the incrementalist approach for a more direct assault on democratic constitutionalism.