Environmental Regulations in Private and Mixed Duopolies: Emission Taxes versus Green R&D Subsidies
Environmental Regulations in Private and Mixed Duopolies: Emission Taxes versus Green R&D Subsidies
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私营和混合双头垄断的环境法规：排放税与绿色R
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Chul‐Hi Park
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sang‐Ho Lee;Chul‐Hi Park
在存在R&D溢出效应的情况下，我们比较了私人和混合双寡头市场中排放税和绿色R&D补贴的环境规制。研究结果表明，当绿色研发成本较低（较高）时，不考虑研发溢出效应，绿色研发补贴优于（劣于）排放税，而上市公司的存在会鼓励政府采取补贴政策。然后，我们表明，最优的政策选择取决于R&D成本的水平和R&D溢出的程度。特别是当R&D成本高而溢出率（不）弱时，政府应该选择征收排放税，而（不）对上市公司进行私有化。但是，在研发成本较低的情况下，无论研发溢出效应如何，这种私有化政策对社会都是不利的。
In the presence of R&D spillovers, we compare environmental regulations between an emission taxes and green R&D subsidies in private and mixed duopoly markets. We show that the green R&D subsidy is better (worse) than the emission tax when the green R&D cost is low (high) irrespective of the R&D spillovers, whereas the existence of a public firm encourages the government to adopt the subsidy policy. We then show that the optimal policy choice depends on the level of the R&D cost and the degree of R&D spillovers. In particular, when the R&D cost is high and the spillover rate is (not) weak, the government should choose the emission tax and (not) privatize the public firm. However, when the R&D cost is low, such a privatization policy is not desirable to society irrespective of the R&D spillovers.