Assessing the bioweapons threat
Assessing the bioweapons threat
复制标题
评估生物武器威胁
作者：
Crystal Boddie;Matthew Watson;G. Ackerman;G. Gronvall
专家们对风险的看法是否有一致的基础？美国政府（USG）已采取措施，旨在减少滥用研究的可能性-在最近的一项行动中，宣布暂停对流感功能获得研究的资助，直到进行风险效益分析（1）。预计分析将审查生物安全问题，这种研究产生生物武器制剂的可能性，以及出版物可能降低生物武器开发障碍的可能性。然而，要分析生物研究的安全风险，首先必须确定生物武器威胁国家安全的可能性，以及合法研究被滥用的风险程度。这种评估充满了不确定性。
Is there a foundation of agreement among experts about risk? The U.S. government (USG) has taken steps intended to diminish the likelihood of misuse of research—in one recent action, declaring a funding moratorium on gain-of-function studies on influenza until a risk-benefit analysis can be conducted (1). The analysis is expected to examine biosafety concerns, the potential for such research to produce a biological weapons agent, and the possibility that publication may lower barriers to bioweapons development (1). To analyze the security risks of biological research, however, it is first necessary to determine the likelihood that bioweapons will threaten national security and to what degree legitimate research is at risk of misuse. This type of assessment is fraught with uncertainty.