Surrogate Scoring Rules and a Dominant Truth Serum for Information Elicitation
Surrogate Scoring Rules and a Dominant Truth Serum for Information Elicitation
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用于信息获取的替代评分规则和显性真理血清
DOI:
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
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通讯作者:
Yiling Chen
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Yang Liu;Yiling Chen
Strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR) are widely used when designing incentive mechanisms to elicit private information from strategic agents using realized ground truth signals, and they can help quantify the value of elicited information. In this paper, we extend such scoring rules to settings where a mechanism designer does not have access to ground truth. We consider two such settings: (i) a setting when the mechanism designer has access to a noisy proxy version of the ground truth, with known biases; and (ii) the standard peer prediction setting where agents' reports are the only source of information that the mechanism designer has.
We introduce surrogate scoring rules (SSR) for the first setting, which use the noisy ground truth to evaluate quality of elicited information. We show that SSR preserves the strict properness of SPSR. Using SSR, we then develop a multi-task scoring mechanism -- called dominant truth serum (DTS) -- to achieve strict properness when the mechanism designer only has access to agents' reports. In comparison to standard equilibrium concepts in peer prediction, we show that DTS can achieve truthfulness in a multi-task dominant strategy. A salient feature of SSR and DTS is that they quantify the quality of information despite lack of ground truth, just as proper scoring rules do for the with verification setting. Our method is verified both theoretically and empirically using data collected from real human participants.