Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
复制标题
最高价格密封投标拍卖中的模糊性厌恶
DOI：
10.1007/bf01067681
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Martin Weber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ahti Salo;Martin Weber
在具有独立私人价值的第一价格密封投标拍卖上的实验表明，提交的投标通常超过风险中性投标人的纳什均衡预测。现有的投标模型通过假设投标人是风险厌恶的，并且能够对他们的获胜概率做出完整和正确的推断来解释这一现象。在这篇文章中，我们使用Choquet期望效用（CEU）理论来证明，观察到的投标行为也可以归因于模糊性厌恶，导致投标人低估他们赢得拍卖的机会。通过对近期投标数据的分析，给出了CEU投标模型的实证支持。
Experiments on first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values have shown that submitted bids typically exceed Nash-equilibrium predictions for risk-neutral bidders. Existing bidding models explain this phenomenon by assuming that the bidders are risk-averse and capable of drawing complete and correct inferences about their winning probabilities. In this article, we use the Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory to demonstrate that the observed bidding behavior can also be attributed to ambiguity aversion which causes the bidders to underestimate their chances of winning the auction. Empirical support for CEU bidding models is given through an analysis of recent bidding data.