A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints
A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints
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DOI:
10.1007/s43069-023-00195-7
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发表时间:
2023-03
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Ping Zhan
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Ping Zhan
We consider the problem of allocating divisible/indivisible goods to agents according to agents’ ordinal preferences. Hashimoto et al. provided a nonalgorithmic and axiomatic characterization of well-studiedprobabilistic serial(PS) mechanism. Recently, Fujishige et al. generalized the PS mechanism where goods are enlarged from a fixed set to a family of sets which is a polytope defined by a system of linear inequalities associated with submodular functions. The aboveextended PS(EPS) greatly improved the flexibility of allocations. Based on these two results, in this paper, we investigate the nonalgorithmic and axiomatic characterization of EPS. We show that the EPS rule is theonlymechanism satisfying theordinal fairnessand a newly definednon-wastefulness. The submodularity plays a crucial role in our arguments.