A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints

A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints
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DOI:
10.1007/s43069-023-00195-7
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发表时间:
2023-03
期刊:
Operations Research Forum
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Ping Zhan
Ping Zhan
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ping Zhan

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我们考虑的问题,分配可分/不可分的货物代理根据代理人的顺序偏好。Hashimoto等人提供了一个非算法的和公理化的表征研究良好的概率串行(PS)机制。最近,Fujishige等人推广了PS机制,其中商品从固定集合扩展到集合族,集合族是由与子模函数相关的线性不等式系统定义的多面体。扩展后的PS(EPS)大大提高了分配的灵活性。基于这两个结果,本文研究了EPS的非算法性和公理化刻画。我们证明了EPS规则是唯一满足顺序公平性和新定义的非浪费性的机制。子模块性在我们的论证中起着至关重要的作用。
We consider the problem of allocating divisible/indivisible goods to agents according to agents’ ordinal preferences. Hashimoto et al. provided a nonalgorithmic and axiomatic characterization of well-studiedprobabilistic serial(PS) mechanism. Recently, Fujishige et al. generalized the PS mechanism where goods are enlarged from a fixed set to a family of sets which is a polytope defined by a system of linear inequalities associated with submodular functions. The aboveextended PS(EPS) greatly improved the flexibility of allocations. Based on these two results, in this paper, we investigate the nonalgorithmic and axiomatic characterization of EPS. We show that the EPS rule is theonlymechanism satisfying theordinal fairnessand a newly definednon-wastefulness. The submodularity plays a crucial role in our arguments.