Should I stay or should I go? Carbon leakage and ETS in an evolutionary model

Should I stay or should I go? Carbon leakage and ETS in an evolutionary model
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我应该走还是留?

DOI:
10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105561
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
影响因子:
12.8
通讯作者:
M. Sodini
M. Sodini
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Antoci;S. Borghesi;Gianluca Iannucci;M. Sodini

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排放权交易作为应对气候变化的适当工具,在世界各地越来越重要。然而,在没有全球碳市场的情况下,单方面的碳政策最终可能会造成碳泄漏效应,如果未来碳价格上涨以实现更雄心勃勃的减排目标,情况就更是如此。本文旨在探讨排放交易系统(ETS)可能的非本地化效应,提出了一个进化的理论模型,在该模型中,受管制的公司决定是否留下来(保持其生产活动在国内)或离开(将生产转移到国外,没有ETS的地方)模仿其他公司做什么。我们调查了这一决定是如何受到一些关键的ETS设计功能,如排放量上限,免费授予ETS公司的配额数量,配额的底价水平的影响。数值模拟表明,企业在决定是减少排放量还是迁往国外时,对降低绿色技术成本的政策比排放交易计划设计的具体特点,如排放上限、最低价格和免费发放的许可证数量的变化更为敏感。
Emissions trading is gaining increasing importance around the world as a suitable instrument to address climate change. In the absence of a global carbon market, however, unilateral carbon policies may end up causing carbon leakage effects, the more so if carbon prices are to increase in the future to achieve more ambitious emissions abatement targets. This paper intends to explore the possible delocalization effects of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) by proposing an evolutionary theoretical model in which regulated firms decide whether to stay (keep their production activities in the domestic country) or leave (move production abroad where no ETS is in place) imitating what other firms do. We investigate how this decision is affected by some key ETS design features, such as the emissions cap, the number of allowances granted for free to ETS firms, the level of a floor price for allowances. Numerical simulations show that the firms’ decision on whether to abate emissions or relocate abroad are more sensitive to policies that reduce the cost of green technologies than to changes in specific features of the ETS design such as the emissions cap, the floor price and the number of permits granted for free.