Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.99580
复制
发表时间：
1999-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michael C. Jensen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michael C. Jensen
管理者和股东的利益和激励在公司的最佳规模和向股东支付现金等问题上发生冲突。这些冲突在拥有大量自由现金流的公司中尤其严重，这些公司拥有的现金比有利可图的投资机会更多。这里发展的理论解释了1）债务在降低自由现金流的代理成本方面的好处，2）债务如何替代股息，3）为什么“多样化”计划比同一业务线的收购或扩张或清算动机的收购更有可能产生亏损，4）为什么在广播和烟草等多种活动中产生收购活动的因素与石油类似，（5）为什么收购者和某些目标在收购前表现得异常好。
The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in firms with large free cash flows—more cash than profitable investment opportunities. The theory developed here explains 1) the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, 2) how debt can substitute for dividends, 3) why “diversification” programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidationmotivated takeovers, 4) why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil, and 5) why bidders and some targets tend to perform abnormally well prior to takeover.